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This is an attempt at a succinct survey, from methodological and epistemological 
perspectives, of the burgeoning, apparently unstructured, field of what is often – 
misleadingly – referred to as computational economics. We identify and characterise 
four frontier research fields, encompassing both micro and macro aspects of 
economic theory, where machine computation play crucial roles in formal modelling 
exercises: algorithmic behavioural economics, computable general equilibrium theory, agent 
based computational economics and computable economics. In some senses these four 
research frontiers raise, without resolving, many interesting methodological and 
epistemological issues in economic theorising in (alternative) mathematical modes.  
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1. A Preamble 
"Computing is integral to science – not just as a tool for analyzing data, 
but as an agent of thought and discovery."  
[20], p. 369, italics added.   
 
No one economist – although he was more than just an economist – 
considered, modelled and implemented the idea of ‘computing ..... as an agent 
of thought and discovery’ better or more systematically, in human problem 
solving, organization theory, decision making in economics, models of 
discovery, evolutionary dynamics, and much else of core relevance to 
economic theory, than Herbert Simon 1. In these two senses computing is 
clearly an epistemic and epistemological agent. On the other hand, the 
computer is undoubtedly also a ‘tool for analyzing data’, an aspect precisely 
and perceptively characterised by Richard Stone and Alan Brown in their 
pioneering work on A Computable Model of Growth2:  
 
Our approach is quantitative because economic life is largely 
concerned with quantities. We use computers because they are the best 
means that exist for answering the questions we ask. It is our 
responsibility to formulate the questions and get together the data 
which the computer needs to answer them.   
[79], p.viii; italics in original.     
 
Remarkably – though not unexpectedly, at least to us3  – thirty four years later, 
                                                 
1When we refer to Classical Behavioural Economics, it is to the kind of computationally 
underpinned research program in these fields broached by Simon that will be meant (see [93] 
& [43], [47], [63], [65], [66], [67], [68], [69], [70], [71], [72], [73]). 
2It is little recognized by one wing of so-called computational economists (eg., [22]) that the 
research program of the Cambridge Growth Project under the direction of Richard Stone 
emerged independently of – even prior to – Johansen’s justly famous work on a 
computational Multi-Sectoral Growth Model (cf., [35]). 
3‘Not unexpectedly’ because newclassical scholarship on traditions and foundations – 
whether of the doctrine historical variety in economics or of knowledge of mathematical 
traditions – is both selectively doctrinaire and unusually narrow, bordering on being 
comprehensively ahistorical.  
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we find two of the undisputed pioneers of real business cycle (RBC) theory, 
the core constituent of the Stochastic Dynamic General Equilibrium4 (SDGE) 
model, considered one of the two dominant, frontier, ‘schools’ of 
macroeconomics, defining and asserting the meaning of a computational 
experiment in economics as follows ([40], p.67:   
 
"In a computational experiment, the researcher starts by posing a 
well-defined quantitative question. Then the researcher uses both theory 
and measurement to construct a model economy that is a computer 
representation of a national economy. ..... The researcher then calibrates 
the model economy so that it mimics the world along a carefully 
specified set of dimensions. Finally, the computer i s  u s e d  t o  r u n  
experiments that answer the question."     
 
Enormous developments in the theoretical and practical technology of the 
computer have made a tremendous impact on economic methodology in general, 
but also in economic theory in particular. It must be emphasised that these 
references are to the digital computer. There are also analog and hybrid 
computers5 that can be harnessed for service by the economist 6 – or any 
other analyst, in many other fields – to realise the intentions indicated by 
                                                                                                                                            
 
4We prefer what we think is the more descriptively correct Recursive Macroeconomics (see [45]) 
for this ‘school’ (in the sense of [52]) macroeconomics. The recursive in this description and 
encapsulation of Newclassical Macroeconomic methodology refers to the notion of recursion in the 
sense of intuitive iteration that underpins Filtering,  Markov Decision  Processes and Dynamic 
Programming associated with the names of Kalman, Wald and Bellman. The rational agent is, 
thus, formally equivalent to an optimal signal processor in Newclassical Macroeconomics. 
This should be contrasted with Simon’s computational behavioural agent as an Information 
Processing System (IPS) and the algorithmically rational agent (ARA) of computable and 
constructive economics. The latter two notions are grounded in formal recursion theory or 
constructive mathematics. The notions of recursive and iteration in Recursive 
Macroeconomics have nothing whatsoever to do with the rigorous notion of recursive, 
recursion and iteration in Recursion Theory, Constructive Mathematics. 
5Not to mention quantum, DNA and other physical and natural computers that are beginning 
to be realised at the frontiers of theoretical technology. 
6Charles Babbage, viewed in one of his many incarnations as an economist, can be considered 
the only one to have straddled both the digital and analog traditions. There is a story to be  
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Stone & Brown and Kydland & Prescott, as well as to act as ‘an agent of 
thought and discovery’. Indeed, in many ways, the analog computer should 
be more suitable for the purposes of the economic analysts simply because 
theorising in economics is in terms of real numbers and the underpinning 
mathematics is, almost without exception, in terms of real analysis7. The 
seemingly simple observations above capture one of a handful of insightful 
visions that the ubiquity of the computer has conferred upon the intellectual 
adventurer in economics – in particular the epistemically oriented economist. 
Stone & Brown and Kydland & Prescott seem to appeal to the raw quantitative 
economic analyst to respect the language and architecture of the computer in 
pursuing precise numerical investigations in economics.   
 
However, as noted above, economic theorists tend to ‘formulate the 
questions’ in the language of a mathematics that the digital computer does not 
understand - real analysis - but ’get together the data’ that it does, because the 
natural form in which economic data appears or is constructed is in terms of 
integer, natural or rational numbers. The transition between these two 
domains remains a proverbial black box, the interior of which is occasionally 
viewed, using the lenses of numerical analysis, recursion theory or constructive 
mathematics. With the possible exception of the core of economic theory, i.e., 
general equilibrium theory, in its incarnation as computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) theory, and the newer fields of computable and constructive economics, 
                                                                                                                                            
told here, but this is not the forum for it. We shall reserve the story for another occasion. 
7Real analysis, as used by the mathematical economist, in turn, founded on set theory plus the  
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there have been no systematic attempts to develop any aspect of economics in 
such a way as to be consistent with the use of the computer, respecting its 
mathematical, numerical and, hence, also its epistemological – ‘as an agent of 
thought and discovery’ – constraints.   
 
Somewhat surprisingly, the adherents and aficionados of Leif Johansen’s 
classic work on A Multi-Sectoral Study of Economic Growth ([35]) claim that 
this was ’the first CGE model’ ([22], p.6)8. Their rationale for this claim is the 
following (p. 6; last two italics, added):   
 
"[The Johansen model] was general in that it contained .. cost 
minimizing industries and utility-maximizing household sectors....His 
model employed market equilibrium assumptions in the determination 
of prices. Finally, it was computable (and applied). It produced a 
numerical, multi-sectoral description of growth in Norway using 
Norwegian input-output data and estimates of household price and 
income elasticities derived using Frisch’s ... additive utility method."     
 
This is an untenable claim9; but we will not attempt at a substantiation of our 
counter-claim in this paper, reserving it for a different, more focused, exercise. 
Here our aim is to structure and organise the computing tradition in 
economics in the age of the digital computer. For this reason, we accept, pro 
                                                                                                                                            
axiom of choice, whether explicitly acknowledged or not. 
8This claim is repeated in a curiously uninformed and seriously incomplete expository 
chapter on Computational Economics by Paul Humphreys in an otherwise prestigious recent 
‘Handbook’ ([34]). 
9  Our stance on this issue is reflected exactly by the view held by our friend, Lance Taylor. 
After attending the recent 50th anniversary celebrations of the Johansen Model, held in Oslo, 
Lance wrote as follows to the first author (E-mail, 27 August, 2010; italics added): 
" [Most participants at the] conference in honor of the 50th anniversary of Johansen’s 
MSG model [held in Oslo in May, were] thinking that Leif was taking off from 
Arrow-Debreu when in fact he was doing disaggregated macro planning, moving 
around the numbers in a set of accounts that they had been constructed to satisfy. 
There is certainly no mention of A-D in his book."    
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tempore, this claim by Dixon and Parmenter (and like-minded economists). Yet, 
we cannot refrain from raising at least half-an-eyebrow at the notion of 
equating the notion of computable with numerical. This was not the equivalence 
that underpinned the way the Arrow-Debreu General Equilibrium (ADGE) 
was turned into the formal, rigorous, CGE model of Scarf, which will be 
discussed below in section 4.     
 
In footnote 2, above, we claimed that the Computable10 Growth  Model that was 
being developed at the Department of Applied Economics, at Cambridge, 
within the Cambridge Growth Project framework under the direction of Richard 
Stone, was one that was parallel in aims and structure to the Johansen 
exercise. Surely, then, this model has a claim to be a ‘joint first’ CGE exercise, 
with the Johansen MSG model (except for minor details on the way the ‘price 
and income elasticities’ were derived)? Unsurprisingly, this claim, too, has 
been asserted by no less an authority than Graham Pyatt ([54], p.246; italics 
added):  
 
"By the end of the [1950s], a new release of creative energies was 
evident with the launch of the Cambridge Growth Project .... The 
central idea was to synthesize demand analysis with input-output in 
an exercise which paralleled the work in Norway of Leif Johansen and 
can be seen in retrospect as an immediate precursor of applied or general 
equilibrium models."   
 
This claim – that the Cambridge Growth Project work ‘can be seen in 
retrospect as an immediate precursor of applied or general equilibrium 
                                                                                                                                            
 
10Computable, in this context, is simply numerical in the same sense in which it was referred to  
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models’ – is at least as untenable as the previous claim by [22]. Here too, we 
accept this (untenable) claim, pro tempore, for the specific purpose of the aims 
of this chapter. Here, too, what ‘emerged’ as the applied general equilibrium 
modelling tradition, directly down the ADGE and (Scarf) CGE line, had 
nothing whatsoever to do with the way the Cambridge Growth Project 
modelling exercise was implemented. In the Cambridge Growth Project 
tradition – as well as the Johansen MSG exercise – the starting points were the 
necessary balances intrinsic to Social Accounting Matrices (SAM). The 
numerical methods that were used to iterate towards the necessary balances 
in a SAM did not imply the computability of the model as a whole; nor did it 
have anything to do with the theoretical – economic and mathematical – 
underpinnings in an ADGE model.   
 
Suppose, now, we teach our students the rudiments of the mathematics of the 
digital computer - i.e., recursion theory and constructive mathematics - 
simultaneously with the mathematics of general equilibrium theory - i.e., real 
analysis. As a first, tentative, bridge between these three different kinds of 
mathematics, let us also add a small dose of lectures and tutorials on 
computable and constructive analysis, at least as a first exposure of the 
students to those results in these fields that have bearings at least on 
computable general equilibrium theory a la Scarf. Such a curriculum content 
will show that the claims and, in particular, the policy conclusions emanating 
from  applied general equilibrium theory are based on untenable algorithmic 
                                                                                                                                            
in [22], above.  
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mathematical foundations. This is true in spite of the systematic and 
impressive work of Herbert Scarf, Rolf Mantel and others who have sought to 
develop some allegedly constructive11 and computable foundations in core 
areas of general equilibrium theory. In this precise mathematical sense, the 
epistemic and epistemological status of applied claims and assertions – for 
example, in policy domains, especially with anchorings in one or both of the 
fundamental theorems of welfare economics – are, to put it mildly, 
questionable. Some of these points are discussed in section 4, below.   
 
In this paper we have decided to eschew any description or discussion of the 
various uses of numerical methods in economic analysis. We have computable 
reasons for this decision. Most of the models of economic analysis – whether 
micro or macro, game theory of IO – are founded on real analysis 
underpinned by set theory plus the axiom of choice. Results obtained in this 
framework are seriously deficient in numerical content. To infuse numerical 
content via numerical methods do not make the theories computational in any 
rigorous sense. In fact, there is – provably – almost no meaningfully 
approximate connection between a ‘rigorously’ proved, say, equilibrium, and 
its numerically computed approximation – despite many claims to the 
contrary, even at the frontiers of economic analysis.   
 
                                                 
11 I should mention that Douglas Bridges, a mathematician with impeccable constructive 
credentials, made a couple of valiant attempts, one of them with Fred Richman, to infuse a 
serious and rigorous dose of constructivism at the most fundamental level of mathematical 
economics (cf: [11], [12]).  
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In the spectacular developments achieved in dynamical systems theory in the 
second half of the 20th century, the digital computer played a decisive part. 
However, there is a close connection between algorithms and dynamical 
systems via numerical analysis. The use of the digital computer to study 
continuous dynamical systems requires the analyst or the experimenter to 
first discretise the system to be studied. The discretisation processes for 
nonlinear dynamical systems are often intractable and undecidable. On the 
other hand, paradoxically, until very recently the mathematical foundation 
for numerical analysis was not developed in a way that was consistent with 
the mathematical foundation of the digital computer - i.e., computability 
theory. As a result we have, in economics, a plethora of attempts and claims 
about computational economics that are not well founded on recursion theoretic, 
constructive or a numerical analysis based on formal algorithmic foundations.   
Now, there are at least two ways out of the dilemma faced by the 
computational economist. Either be rigorous about the theory of approximations 
and numerical analysis in discretising the continuous; or, look for a 
mathematical foundation for numerical analysis taking heed of the following 
observations remarks by Blum, et.al (to which we will refer as BCSS):  
 
"There is a substantial conflict between theoretical computer science 
and numerical analysis. These two subjects with common goals have 
grown apart. For example, computer scientists are uneasy with 
calculus, whereas numerical analysis thrives on it. On the other hand 
numerical analysts see no use for the Turing machine.  
The conflict has at its roots another age-old conflict, that between the 
continuous and the discrete. Computer science is oriented by the digital 
nature of machines and by its discrete foundations given by Turing 
machines. For numerical analysis, systems of equations and differential  
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equations are central and this discipline depends heavily on the 
continuous nature of the real numbers.    ...   
Use of Turing machines yields a unifying concept of the algorithm well 
formalized. ....   
The situation in numerical analysis is quite the opposite. Algorithms 
are primarily a means to solve practical problems. There is not even a 
formal definition of algorithm in the subject.  ....  
A major obstacle to reconciling scientific computation and computer 
science is the present view of the machine, that is, the digital computer. 
As long as the computer is seen simply as a finite or discrete subject, it 
will be difficult to systematize numerical analysis. We believe that the 
Turing machine as a foundation for real number algorithms can only 
obscure concepts.   
Towards resolving the problem we have posed, we are led to 
expanding the theoretical model of the machine to allow real numbers 
as inputs."   
[9], p.23; italics added.     
 
This is a strategy that is a compromise between using an analog computer and 
a digital one, on the one hand, and, on the other, between accepting either 
constructive or computable analysis and classical real analysis. The model of 
computation developed with great ingenuity by Smale and his co-workers 
may well be the best way to retain much of classical mathematical economics 
while still being able to pose and answer meaningfully questions about 
decidability, computability and computational complexity - and to retain 
numerical meaning in the whole framework.   
 
Yet, we are not convinced at all that the BCSS model is of much relevance to 
the issue of computable foundations for numerical analysis. Our reasons are 
as follows:   
 
(a) What is wrong with the analogue model of computation over the reals and  
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why was it not invoked to provide the mathematical and physical foundation 
for numerical analysis by the authors of the BCSS model? This is particularly 
relevant in this paper, given that a noble analogue computing tradition 
existed – and flourished – in economics, in different eras of the development 
of the subject.   
 
(b) What is wrong with the computable and recursive analytic model, with its 
rich complexity theoretic analysis of classic optimization operators routinely 
used in economic theory (optimal control, dynamic programming, etc.,), of 
the perennial paradoxes of the initial value problem on ordinary differential 
equations and their solution complexities and of much else in a similar vein.   
 
(c) We don’t think there is any historical or analytical substance to the 
Newtonian vision frequently invoked as a backdrop against which to justify 
the need for a new mathematical foundation for numerical analysis.   
 
(d) Finally, there is an important strand of research that has begun to interpret 
numerical algorithms as dynamical systems; from this kind of interpretation 
to a study of undecidability and incompleteness of numerical algorithms is an 
easy and fascinating frontier research topic within the framework of 
computable analysis, which owes nothing to - and has no need for - the BCSS 
kind of modelling framework – even though there are claims to the contrary 
in [9] regarding such issues12. This is also a point of relevance for the problem 
                                                 
12Primarily in relation to the decidability problems of the Mandelbrot and Julia sets, as posed  
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of being rigorous about the theory of approximations and numerical analysis 
in discretising the continuous. It is not just a question about accurate or 
rigorous discretizations of a real analytic model for implementation on a 
digital computer; but we will have to leave it at that, for now.   
 
Therefore, against the general backdrop provided in this Preamble, we will 
concentrate only on the four areas of Algorithmic Behavioural Economics, 
Computable General Equilibrium Theory, Computable Economics and Agent 
Based Computational Economics in discussing the role of Computation in 
Economics. With this in mind, in section 2, an ultra-brief outline of The 
Computing Tradition in Economics is given. In sections 3, 4, 5 & 6, 
algorithmic behavioural economics, computable general equilibrium theory, 
computable economics and agent based computational economics are 
outlined and critically discussed, as afar as possible in methodological and 
epistemological terms. The concluding section, titled ‘Towards an Algorithmic 
Approach to the Social Sciences’ is squarely epistemological in the vision we try 
to cultivate, from the lessons of approximately six decades of machine 
computing traditions in economics – both theoretical and applied.   
 
Before concluding the ‘preamble’ it may be apposite to ask a simple, but 
obvious, question: What is a computation?13 In a sense there is a simple, 
concise, answer to this question. A computation is that which is 
                                                                                                                                            
by Penrose, [51], p. 124, ff. 
13A splendid and characteristically clear, simple – yet deep – discussion of this question can  
13 
 
implementable via a Turing Machine. But that leads to further questions: are 
there other models of computation that are richer in some sense - in the 
nature of the data analyzable, in the kind of processing speeds, in the class of 
computable functions, and so on. Mercifully, the Church-Turing Thesis 
obviates the need for any such elaboration: any and every computation that is 
implementable by a Turing Machine answers all such questions 
unambiguously: every model of computation is formally equivalent with 
respect to each of these – and many other – questions. There remains, of 
course, the notion of computation intrinsic to constructive mathematics, 
where no invoking of anything similar to a Church-Turing Thesis. We will 
have to leave any discussion of this important issue for another exercise. It 
means, of course, the answer to the question, ’What is a computation’, may be 
unambiguous!  
2. The Machine Computing Tradition in Economics 
The Method I take to do this, is not yet very usual; for instead of using 
only comparative and superlative Words, and intellectual Arguments, I 
have taken the course (as a Specimen of the Political Arithmetick I have 
long aimed at) to express my self in Terms of Number, Weight, or 
Measure; .....   
Now the Observations or Positions expressed by Number, Weight, and 
Measure, upon which I bottom the ensuing Discourses, are either true, 
or not apparently false, and which if they are not already true, certain, 
and evident, yet may be made so by the Sovereign Power, Nam id 
certum est quod certum reddi potest, and if they are false, not so false as to 
destroy the Argument they are brought for; but at worst are sufficient 
as Suppositions to shew the way to that Knowledge I aim at.  
William Petty, Preface to Political Arithmetick (3rd Edition), 169014; 
italics (non Latin) added.     
 
                                                                                                                                            
be found in [17]. 
14Accessed at: http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/petty/  
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Petty, ‘to shew the way to that Knowledge [he] aimed at’ – i.e., for reasons of 
epistemics and epistemology – aimed ’to express [himself] in Terms of Number, 
Weight or Measure’ – a tradition nobly inherited and resolutely preserved 
and enhanced by his Physiocratic and Classical Economic successors. 
Calculating, estimating, comparing, constructing and reasoning with 
numerical ratios, averages, series, tables areas, volumes and so on – in short, 
‘analyzing data’, whether natural or artificial – underpinned much inference 
and some deduction is the way our classical and Physiocratic predecessors 
came to policy precepts. However, with the exception of Charles Babbage and, 
possibly, Jevons, till Irving Fisher ([27]), in 1891, constructed his ‘remarkable 
hydraulic [analogue computing] apparatus for calculating equilibrium prices’ 
([10], p. 57)15, resorting to actually constructed machine models of computing in 
economics seems to have remained an isolated example. Fisher’s own 
description of the functioning of his hydraulic analogue computing machine 
clarifies an important feature of such computations: their independence from 
any intermediation via numerical analysis:   
 
"The [hydraulic] mechanism just described is the physical analogue of 
the ideal economic market16. The elements which contribute to the 
                                                 
15  As Scarf, ([58], p. 207), points out: “In Mathematical Investigations in the Theory of Value and 
Prices, published in 1892, Irving Fisher described a mechanical and hydraulic analogue device 
intended to calculate equilibrium prices for a general competitive model. ...   
At least two versions of Fisher’s device were actually constructed and apparently performed 
successfully. ....   
The equipment seems remarkably quaint and old-fashioned in this era of high-speed digital 
computers." 
16 In an early analogue approach to the study of macroeconomic dynamics, [81], p. 557, 
indicated the nature of what they mean by .analog., in these contexts (italics added): 
"If a single group of equations can be written which defines the assumed performance for two 
separate systems (each of which within itself represents an orderly or definable behavior), 
one system may be called the complete analogue of the other."     
Obviously, Fisher’s system satisfies this condition - as would any analogue computing system,  
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determination of prices are represented each with its appropriate rôle 
and open to the scrutiny of the eye. We are thus enabled not only to 
obtain a clear and analytical picture of the interdependence of the many 
elements in the causation of prices, but also to employ the mechanism 
as an instrument of investigation and by it, study some complicated 
variations which could scarcely be successfully followed without its 
aid."  
([27], p.44, italics in original)     
 
There were, of course, the famous computing machine metaphors used by 
Walras, Pareto – and, then, inspired by Barone, in the important ’Socialist 
Calculation Debate’, most comprehensively summarised, both critically and 
constructively by Hayek ([32] & [33]). Lange, returning to the theme over 
thirty years later, in his Dobb Festschrift article on The Computer and the 
Market ([41]), muddied the issue by unscholarly and unsubstantiable claims 
for the possibilities of a digital computer (having, in the meanwhile, also 
forgotten that the initial discussions were with reference to analog computing 
machines and, in particular, the metaphor of the market as an analogue 
computer). None of the participants had any technical knowledge of the 
mathematical underpinnings of computing, in a sense understandably so, 
since the mathematical foundations of computing were being placed on a 
rigorous basis just during those very years that the debate was at its height17.  
 
Analogue computing techniques in economics had the proverbial still birth. 
There was a flurry of activities in the late 1940s and early 1950s, at the hands 
of A.W.H. (Bill) Phillips, Richard M. Goodwin, Herbert A. Simon, Robert H. 
                                                                                                                                            
by definition. 
17Unless one expected such true economic scholars, before the kind of mathematization of 
economics that we are familiar with now, to be familiar with Brouwerian constructive 
mathematics, which was reaching its zenith, also during those very years.  
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Strotz, Otto Smith, Arnold Tustin, Roy Allen, Oscar Lange and a few others. 
Phillips built his famous MONIAC18 hydraulic national income machine at 
the end of the 40s and it was used at many Universities - and even at the 
Central Bank of Guatemala - for teaching purposes and even as late as the 
early 70s Richard Goodwin, at Cambridge University, taught one of us 
elementary principles of coupled market dynamics using such a machine. 
Strotz and his associates, at Northwestern University, built electro-analogue 
machines to study inventory dynamics and nonlinear business cycle theories 
of the Hicks-Goodwin varieties. Otto Smith and R.M. Saunders, at the 
University of California at Berkeley, built an electro-analogue machine to 
study and simulate a Kalecki-type business cycle model. Roy Allen’s 
successful textbooks on Macroeconomics and Mathematical Economics of the 
50s - extending into the late 60s - contained pedagogical circuit devices 
modelling business cycle theories (cf: [2] especially chapter 9; and [3], 
especially chapter 18). Arnold Tustin’s highly imaginative, but failed textbook 
attempt to familiarise economists with the use of servomechanism theory to 
build analogue machines as models of economic dynamics ([87]) and Oscar 
Lange’s attractive, elementary, expository book with a similar purpose ([44]) 
also suffered the fate of ‘stillbirth’, at the dawn of the digital computing age.   
 
Humphreys ([34]) refers to nonlinear business cycle theories19  as examples of 
                                                 
18Monetary National Income Accounting Analogue Computing Machine. 
19 In an earlier footnote we referred to this article as curiously uninformed and seriously 
incomplete! A concrete example of the reason for us to characterise it as such is his reference 
to [39] for references to ‘nonlinear business cycle theories’. Anyone who takes seriously this  
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computational ‘studies’ that straddle ‘the pre-computational era and the era 
of computational economics’, claiming that ’there is no sharp divide 
between ’the two eras’. This claim can be substantiated by a more finessed 
study of the particular example of a canonical nonlinear business cycle 
equation, using – as was, indeed, actually done – analogue computing 
machines as in the ‘pre-computational era’ and comparing it with its study 
using a digital computing machine of the ‘era of computational economics’.   
 
The example we have chosen here encapsulates a noble tradition of 
computation in economics in every sense of this concept, to study a precisely 
specified mathematical system on both analogue and digital computers. It is, 
in a precise sense, also a substitute for an analytical study (because such a 
study is provably ‘unlikely’ to succeed in any meaningful way). Moreover, it 
can be viewed as an explicit example of an epistemological tool to interpret 
the results (most of which were unexpected), finally, to gain insight into the 
link between a computing machine and its theory and the theory of nonlinear 
dynamical systems. The latter point is turning out to be the most significant 
from the point of view of the epistemology of computation, since the 
interaction can only be explored by representing the one system by the other – 
and, therefore, even an exploration into a new domain: studying the 
                                                                                                                                            
kind of flippant, frivolous, reference and does check-up on  Krugman’s booklet, would and 
the strange claim (ibid, p. 7): 
"I may be the only economist in my generation who has even heard of [these nonlinear 
business cycle theories]."     
Krugman is 57 years old; we could easily list a dozen eminent economist of his generation, 
give or take a few years, who are seriously competent in nonlinear business cycle theories of  
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repertoire of digital machine behaviour with analogue computing machines, 
and vice versa.  
 
Consider, therefore, the following equation, representing a classical 
Keynesian nonlinear multiplier-accelerator model of the dynamics of national 
income, y: 
    
  ) ( ) ( )] ( [ ) ( ) - (1 (t) t l t t y t y y + + − = + β θ φ α ε    (1) 
 
Now, there are at least six different ways to investigate solutions to this 
nonlinear difference-differential equation:   
• In old fashioned analytical modes;   
• Using Non-standard analysis;   
• Graphically, i.e., in terms of the geometry of dynamic behaviour, as 
usually done in the qualitative theory of differential equations;   
• By the method of equivalent linearization;   
• Using an electro-analogue20 computer;  
• Using digital computers;   
It is, of course, only the last two alternatives that are of relevance in this 
                                                                                                                                            
the Goodwin-Kaldor-Hicks era, developing it at some of the current frontiers of 
macroeconomic theory. 
20In parallel, but slightly earlier, work of a related nature, [81], p. 557, indicated the nature of 
what they mean by .analog., in these contexts (italics added): 
  "If a single group of equations can be written which defines the assumed performance for two 
separate systems (each of which within itself represents an orderly or definable behavior), 
one system may be called the complete analogue of the other."        
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discussion. Assuming, for example,  ) ( ) ( t l t + β   a constant 21  and 






) ( ) ( t l t
one obtains a mixed nonlinear difference-differential equation:   
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In the first case, expanding (2) by a Taylor series approximation and retaining only 
the first two terms, one obtained the famous (unforced) Rayleigh (- van der Pol) - type 
equation:  0
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         ( 3 )  
With this approximated reformulation began an ‘industry’ in the endogenous 
theory of the business cycle, where the cardinal desideratum was the 
existence of a unique, stable, limit cycle, independent of initial conditions. All 
four desiderata were violated when the approximations were more precise – 
in a purely technical sense – and the analysis proceeded via studies by means 
of analogue and digital computing machines. Even more interestingly, the 
insights obtained from an analogue computing machine study provided hints 
in setting up a computing study of (1) by means of digital computing 
machines.  
 
Now, using an electro-analog computer, it was found, in [82], that the 
approximation of (1) retaining the first four terms of a Taylor series expansion, 
                                                 
21If  ) ( ) ( t l t + β was not assumed a constant, the obdurate forced version of (3) would have to 
be confronted, without any hope of a disciplined solution even with the help of computing  
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generated twenty-five limit cycles, and a potential for a countable infinity of 
limit cycles with further higher order terms included in the approximations. 
Moreover, in its original formulation, one of the desired criteria for the 
nonlinear formulation of the endogenous model of the business cycle, was to 
generate self-sustaining fluctuations, independent of initial conditions. This latter 
property was lost when the approximation was made more precise.   
 
Next, coupling two equations of type (3), via the Phillips 
Electro-Mechanical-Hydraulic Analogue Computing Machine ([30]), Goodwin 
and Phillips were able to generate – unexpectedly – the quasi-periodic 
paradox (cf., [1]). Neither Goodwin, nor Phillips, who did the 
coupled-dynamics computation on the Phillips Machine, had any clue – 
theoretical or otherwise – about interpreting and encapsulating this outcome 
in any economic theoretical formalization. The key point is that they were 
surprised by the outcome and did not know how to interpret it when it 
emerged. This is where the richness of the epistemology of computation 
manifests itself most dramatically. There was no macrodynamic theory to 
which they could relate the observed behaviour, which was contrary to 
expected behaviour.   
 
Finally, one of us – Zambelli ([97] – repeated the exercise in [82], but this time 
on a digital computer. Our results came as a surprise to us: although we can 
confirm the results in [82], the outcomes are richer and more varied and we 
                                                                                                                                            
machines, whether analog or digital.  
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would have no idea which way to proceed, if we are wedded to an 
equilibrium norm to which the results have to conform.   
 
It goes without saying that one of he key differences between analogue and 
digital computing is that in the latter the intermediation between the 
continuous and the discrete is achieved by means of numerical procedures; 
this intermediation is circumvented in the analogue tradition. In this sense, 
there is a sharp difference between ‘the pre-computational era and the era of 
computational economics’. Much of what is routinely referred to as 
computational economics in the modern era is simply variations on the theme 
of numerical analysis, without any anchoring in the mathematical theory of 
the computer, whether digital or analogue.   
3. Classical Behavioural Economics 
"If we hurry, we can catch up to Turing on the path he pointed out to 
us so many years ago."   
[72], p. 101     
3.1. A Brief Note on Classical vs. Modern Behavioural Economics 
Herbert Simon combined and encapsulated, in an intrinsically dynamic, 
decison-theoretic framework, a computationally founded system of choice and 
decision, both entirely rational in a broad sense. ‘Computational’ has always 
meant ‘computable’ in the Turing sense, at least in our reading of Simon’s 
magisterial writings. In particular, in the context of bounded rationality, 
satisficing and their underpinnings in the architecture of human thinking, it 
was the path broached by Turing that guided Simon’s fundamental  
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contributions. In this section we try, in fairly precise and formal ways, to 
suggest  computable foundations for boundedly rational choice and satisficing 
decisions. In a nutshell, the aim is to reformulate bounded rationality and 
satisficing in a computable framework so that their intrinsic (complex) dynamics 
is made explicit in as straightforward a way as possible.   
 
Bounded rationality, satisficing and decision problems are the basic 
foundational pillars on which what we refer to as Classical or Algorithmic 
Behavioural Economics rests. A minor digression on the distinction between 
Classical or Algorithmic Behavioural Economics (CBE 22 ) and Modern 
Behavioural Economics (MBE) may be useful to place the discussion in 
context.  
 
The defining works of CBE were the three pioneering contributions by 
Herbert Simon (and his close, early, collaborators: Alan Newell and Cliff 
Shaw), [65], [66] and [74]. These three defining contributions to CBE were 
brought to an initial completion in the monumental book on Human Problem 
Solving by Newell and Simon, [47].   
 
Meanwhile, almost simultaneously, contrary to current attributions, the seeds 
were laid by Ward Edwards for what is now an orthodox vision of 
Behavioural Economics – which we refer to as Modern Behavioural Economics 
                                                 
22We would have preferred to refer exclusively to Algorithmic Behavioural Economics and, 
therefore, ABE. However, ABE has become one of the usual ways to refer to Agent Based  
23 
 
(MBE)23 – starting from the work of Leonard Savage, who had, himself, 
become a believer in De Finetti’s approach to probability. The three defining, 
absolutely pioneering contributions, by Ward Edwards, works presaging the 
subsequent works by Nobel Laureate Daniel Kahneman (and Amos Twersky) 
on  Prospect Theory, a key foundational basis for Modern Behavioural 
Economics, were, [24], [25] and [26]24. 
  
Both traditions emerged from the infelicities in the axiomatic treatment of 
rationality that came to underpin expected utility maximization, emanating 
from the ground-breaking work of von Neuman-Morgenstern. Both found the 
framework and basis provide by von Neumann-Morgenstern wanting in 
realism – of a basic sort – and lacking in consistency in some of the 
underpinnings. For example, Edwards found the lack of consistency between 
a subjective theory of utility and an objective theory of probability that 
underpinned expected utility maximization. Edwards sought a 
‘reconciliation’ via an appeal and a utilisation of the emerging De 
Finetti-based theory of subjective probability theory that Savage was 
developing just about at that time. The flaw detected, and perceptively 
tackled by Edwards, persists in the post-Prospect theory of behavioural 
                                                                                                                                            
Economics; hence we opt for CBE. 
23The beginning of Modern Behavioural Economics is generally identified with Thaler ([84]), for 
example by Camerer, Loewenstein and Rabin (cf., [15], p.xxii), 
24A discerning reader would already have noticed that five of the six classic contributions 
were published in frontier Psychological Journals! One possibly obvious inference from this 
elementary observation may well be that the two classes of contributions emerged 
independently, focussing on those cognitive aspects that were neglected in more orthodox 
economic theory of decision making, by individual agents and in organisations. But this 
inference – we think – would be most misleading.  
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economics, now called Modern Behavioural Economics. These issues will be 
discussed, critically and exhaustively, in the relevant introductions to the 
respective volumes envisaged in this series.   
 
Simon’s starting point was computational cognitive science, in its psychological 
variants, and its confrontation with the theories of decision making 
economists were developing, applying and refining, all of which were 
variations on the theme of the von Neumann-Morgenstern starting point, 
further developed by Nash and Arrow-Debreu. The key notion was 
computationally underpinning rational decision making, thereby naturally and 
intrinsically taking into account the theoretical limits that comes with 
computability theory. In addition, this framework came with natural measures 
of computational complexity and they were imaginatively, and with great 
originality, incorporated into the kind of theories of decision making Simon 
developed within the formal frame work of what is called, in 
metamathematics and mathematical logic, decision problems (of which 
optimization is a special case).   
 
From the line of research initiated with single-handed determination by Ward 
Edwards we have seen the emergence of modern Behavioural Economics, 
Behavioural Finance, Behavioural Game Theory and Behavioural 
Neuroeconomics.  
 
From the work initiated by Herbert Simon, we have seen the emergence of  
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rich and deep concepts like Bounded rationality and Satisficing and wholly 
refreshing fields like Evolutionary Growth Theory, at the hands of classical 
behavioural economists like Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter; adaptive 
economic dynamics by Richard Day; Models of Discovery by Simon and his 
many associates; the problem of causality and evolution in 
semi-decomposable systems by Simon and others; and much else.   
3.2. Classical Behavioural Economics - Computable Foundations 
A decision problem asks whether there exists an algorithm to decide whether a 
mathematical assertion does or does not have a proof; or a formal problem 
does or does not have an algorithmic solution. Thus the characterization 
makes clear the crucial role of an underpinning model of computation; secondly, 
the answer is in the form of a yes/no response. Of course, there is the third 
alternative of ‘undecidable’, too, but that is a vast issue outside the scope of this 
paper. It is in this sense of decision problems that we interpret the word 
‘decisions’ here.   
 
As for ‘problem solving’, we shall assume that this is to be interpreted in the 
sense in which it is defined and used in the monumental classic by Newell 
and Simon ([47]).   
 
Finally, the model of computation is the Turing model, subject to the 
Church-Turing Thesis. To give a rigorous mathematical foundation for  
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bounded rationality and satisficing, as decision problems25, it is necessary to 
underpin them in a dynamic model of choice in a computable framework. 
However, these are not two separate problems. Any formalization 
underpinned by a model of computation in the sense of computability theory 
is, dually, intrinsically dynamic. 
 
Remark1 Decidable-Undecidable, Solvable-Unsolvable, Computable-Uncomputable, 
etc., are concepts that are given content algorithmically.   
 
Now consider the Boolean formula:   
 
}) { } { } ({ }) { ( }) { ( }) { ( ) ( 3 2 1 1 3 3 2 2 1 3 2 1 x x x x x x x x x x x x ¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ¬ ∧ ¬ ∨ ∧ ¬ ∨ ∧ ¬ ∨ ∧ ∨ ∨  ---(4) 
 
Remark 2 Each subformula within parenthesis is called a clause; the variables and 
their negations that constitute clauses are called literals; It is ‘easy’ to ‘see’ that for the 
truth value of the above Boolean formula to be  1 ) ( = i x t  all the subformulas within 
each of the parenthesis will have to be true. It is equally ‘easy’ to see that no truth 
assignments whatsoever can satisfy the formula such that its global value is true. This 
Boolean formula is unsatisfiable.   
                                                 
25 The three most important classes of decision problems that almost characterise the subject 
of computational complexity theory, underpinned by a model of computation in general, the 
model of computation in this context is the Nondeterministic Turing Machine are the P, NP 
and NP-Complete classes. Concisely, but not quite precisely, they can be described as follows: 
[1]  P denotes the class of computable problems that are solvable in time bounded by a 
polynomial function of the size of the input; 
[2]  NP is the class of computable problems for which a solution can be verified in 
polynomial time; 
[3]  A computable problem lies in the class called NP-Complete if every problem that is 




Problem 3 SAT – The Satisfiability Problem   
Given  m clauses,  ) ,.... 1 ( m i Ci = , containing the literals (of)  ) ,.... 1 ( n j x j = , 
determine if the formula is  m C C C C ∧ ∧ ∧ ... 3 2 1 satisfiable.  
 
Determine means ‘find an (efficient) algorithm’. To date it is not known 
whether there is an efficient algorithm to solve the satisfiability problem – i.e., to 
determine the truth value of a Boolean formula. In other words, it is not 
known whether SAT  P ∈  But:  
 
Theorem 4 SAT  NP ∈  
 
Definition 5  A Boolean formula consisting of many clauses connected by 
conjunction (i.e.,∧) is said to be in Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF). 
 
Finally, we have Cook’s famous theorem:   
 
Theorem 6 Cook’s Theorem   
SAT is NP– Complete  
 
I t  i s  i n  t h e  a b o v e  k i n d  o f  c o n t e x t and framework within which we are 
interpreting Simon’s vision of behavioural economics. In this framework 
optimization is a very special case of the more general decision problem  
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approach. The real mathematical content of satisficing26 is best interpreted in 
terms of the satisfiability problem of computational complexity theory, the 
framework used by Simon consistently and persistently - and a framework to 
which he himself made pioneering contributions.   
 
Finally, there is the computably underpinned definition of bounded 
rationality.  
 
Theorem 7    The process of rational choice by an economic agent is formally 
equivalent to the computing activity of a suitably programmed (Universal) Turing 
machine.  
 
Proof.  By construction. See 3.2, pp. 29-36, Computable Economics  [89]    
 
Remark 8 The important caveat is ‘process’ of rational choice, which Simon – more 
than anyone else – tirelessly emphasized by characterizing the difference between 
‘procedural’ and ‘substantive’ rationality; the latter being the defining basis for 
Olympian rationality ([69], p.19), the former that of the computationally 
underpinned problem solver facing decision problems. Any decision – rational or 
not – has a time dimension and, hence, a content in terms of some process. In the 
Olympian model the ‘process’ aspect is submerged and dominated by the static 
                                                 
26  In [73], p. 295, Simon clarified the semantic sense of the word satisfice, by revealing the way 
he came to choose the word: 
"The term ‘satisfice’, which appears in the Oxford English Dictionary as a Northumbrian 
synonym for ‘satisfy’, was borrowed for this new use by H. A. Simon (1956) in ‘Rational 
Choice and the Structure of the Environment’ [i.e., [66]]"        
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optimization operator, By transforming the agent into a problem solver, constrained 
by computational formalisms to determine a decision problem, Simon was able to 
extract the procedural content in any rational choice. The above result is a summary 
of such an approach.   
 
Definition 9 Computation Universality of a Dynamical System   
 
A dynamical system – discrete or continuous – is said to be capable of computation 
universality if, using its initial conditions, it can be programmed to simulate the 
activities of any arbitrary Turing Machine, in particular, the activities of a Universal 
Turing Machine.  
 
Lemma 10 Dynamical Systems capable of Computation Universality can be 
constructed from Turing Machines   
 
Proof.  See  [89].    
 
Theorem 11 Non-Maximum Rational Choice   
 
No trajectory of a dynamical system capable of universal computation can, in 
any ’useful sense’ (see Samuelson’s Nobel Prize lecture, [55]), be related to 
optimization in the Olympian model of rationality.  
 




Theorem 12 Boundedly rational choice by an information processing agent within 
the framework of a decision problem is capable of computation universality.   
 
Proof. An immediate consequence of the definitions and theorems of this 
sub-section.  
 
Remark 13 From this result, in particular, it is clear that the Boundedly Rational 
Agent, satisficing in the context of a decision problem, encapsulates the only notion of 
rationality that can ‘in any useful sense’ be defined procedurally.   
 
We have only scratched a tiny part of the surface of the vast canvass on which 
Simon sketched his vision of a computably underpinned behavioural 
economics. Nothing in Simon’s behavioural economics – i.e., in Classical 
Behavioural Economics – was devoid of computable content.   
 
    We should not end this subsection on Classical Behavioural Economics 
without also indicating where the framework we have developed falls short 
of encapsulating the deep and full force of Simon's visions. One important 
narrowness of vision in our approach is the concentration on time 
computational complexity. The key results here, which we have used above, 
are theorems 4 and 6, particularly the latter, i.e., Cooke's celebrated theorem 
that SAT is NP-Complete. Now, because SAT is NP-Complete, it is reasonable 
to believe that it is unsolvable with a polynomial time algorithm. On the other  
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hand, SAT is solvable even with a linear space algorithm. The theorem in 
space computational complexity that corresponds to Cooke's fundamental 
theorem in time computational complexity is, arguably, Savitch's Theorem 
(see [93]). We have neglected this theorem and also did not discuss the 
implications of the following series of plausible -- not, as yet, entirely definite 





    We should have asked ourselves the obvious question: Why didn't 
Herbert Simon ever occupy himself, ever, with the P vs NP question (one of 
the seven Clay Millennium Problems)? We think a plausible answer to this 
(counterfactual) question is that Simon was intrinsically more interested in 
Space Computational Complexity, as the domain in which human problem 
solving was best considered. 
    An  additional  subsection  here should generalize the definition of 
satisficing in terms of the SAT problem in space computational complexity. 
When that task is undertaken it will be possible to go beyond Chess -- a 
paradigmatic canvas on which Simon sketched many of his conjectures on 
human problem solving -- and begin to try to study GO in terms of the notions 
of classical behavioural economics. This is especially and challengingly so 




4.    Computable General Equilibrium Theory27 
"It is not natural for ‘A implies B’ to mean ‘not A or B’, and students 
will tell you so if you give them the chance. ... [W]e should not be 
surprised to find that certain classically accepted modes of inference 
are no longer correct. The most important of these is the principle of 
the excluded middle -- ‘A or not A’. Constructively, this principle 
would mean that we had a method which, in finitely many purely 
routine steps, would lead to a proof or disproof of an arbitrary 
mathematical assertion A. Of course we have no such method, and 
nobody has the least hope that we ever shall. It is the principle of the 
excluded middle that accounts for almost all of the important 
unconstructivities of classical mathematics."   
[8], pp. 3, 10-11.     
 
The main culprits – although not the only ones – in the failure of so-called 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) theory to be computable or constructive 
are the ‘classically accepted modes of inference’. Unfortunately, to the best of 
our knowledge, none of the practitioners of CGE, nor any one of its ‘offshoots’ 
or alleged ‘generalizations’ – such as Applied General Equilibrium (AGE) theory, 
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium (RCE), or Dynamic General Equilibrium (DGE) 
theory – are either aware of the uncomputability and non-constructivity of 
their equilibria; a fortiori, they seem entirely uninterested in why this is so28. 
                                                 
27  Entirely for reasons of space we do not deal with the burgeoning field of Algorithmic Game Theory 
from the point of view of the methodology of computation as conceived in this paper. However, all of 
the strictures that are presented here ‘against’ the computable foundations of CGE apply, pari passu, to 
the claims and assertions of Algorithmic Game Theory. Computing the uncomputable, deciding the 
undecidable and completing the incompleatable is endemic in mathematical economics, of every 
variety. 
28 Perhaps Fred Richman’s perceptive reflection suggests the exact reason for these peculiar 
blinkers:  
 
"Even those who like algorithms have remarkably little appreciation of the 
thoroughgoing algorithmic thinking that is required for a constructive proof. This is 
illustrated by the nonconstructive nature of many proofs in books on numerical 
analysis, the theoretical study of practical numerical algorithms. I would guess that 
most realist mathematicians are unable even to recognize when a proof is 
constructive in the intuitionist’s sense.   
It is a lot harder than one might think to recognize when a theorem depends on a 
nonconstructive argument. One reason is that proofs are rarely self-contained, but 




One of the great achievements of mathematical economics in the twentieth 
century was the Walrasian economic equilibrium existence proof of Arrow 
and Debreu ([5]). It is listed as the seventh of ten significant29 achievements  in 
applied mathematics in Piergiorgio Odifreddi’s overall list of the 30 great solved 
problems of ‘The Mathematical Century’ ([48]). Its extension to dynamics is 
listed as the eighth of 18 problems for the 21st century - in ‘Hilbertian mode’ - 
by Steve Smale ([76]). Given its undoubted and acknowledged significance in 
the intellectual canvas of 20th century mathematical economics, economic 
theory and applied mathematics, it is not surprising that attempts have been 
made, most notably by Herbert Scarf, to devise algorithmic methods to 
compute Arrow-Debreu equilibria. These attempts have resulted in the 
development of an independent discipline of Computable General Equilibrium 
(CGE) theory. It will not be an exaggeration to claim that, till Scarf’s 
pioneering work on CGE  theory and modelling, the Arrow-Debreu 
achievements remained in the realm of pure theory - whether of economics or 
mathematics; after Scarf, it is, surely, also a significant chapter in applied 
mathematics30.  
 
                                                                                                                                            
theorems have often been internalized to such an extent that we are not aware 
whether or not nonconstructive arguments have been used, or must be used, in their 
proofs. Another reason is that the law of excluded middle [LEM] is so ingrained in 
our thinking that we do not distinguish between different formulations of a theorem 
that are trivially equivalent given LEM, although one formulation may have a 
constructive proof and the other not." [55]     
 
29#3.7 in chapter 3, pp. 122-5. 




On the other hand, the key feature of the CGE research program is its 
schizophrenic nature: all of the mathematical economic theory of general 
equilibrium is practised in the domain of real analysis, and founded on set 
theory plus the axiom of choice. However, all of the computational content of 
CGE is allegedly based on constructive mathematics (although the 
‘computable’ in CGE may suggest a basis in recursion theory). This 
schizophrenia is ostensibly resolved by an appeal to what is known as 
Uzawa’s equivalence theorem ([88]).  Debreu’s admirably concise 
acknowledgement of the importance of Uzawa’s equivalence theorem is a 
testimony to the ‘bridging role’ it plays, between economic equilibrium 
existence theorems and fixed-point theorems, [18], p. 719-720:   
 
“[The equilibrium existence] theorem establishes the existence of a 
price vector yielding a negative or zero excess demand as a direct 
consequence of a deep mathematical result, the fixed-point theorem of 
Kakutani. And one must ask whether the .. proof uses a needlessly 
powerful tool. This question was answered in the negative by Uzawa 
(1962) who showed that [the theorem] directly implies Kakutani’s 
fixed-point  theorem."   
 
Scarf’s insight was, then, to utilize algorithms that had been developed to 
approximate (Brouwer’s) fixed-point theorem – invoking Uzawa’s 
equivalence theorem – to determine approximations to (Walrasian or 
Arrow-Debreu) equilibria. Scarf himself was well aware that these were not 
‘approximations’ of a useful nature (unless conjoined to those intangible 
non-formal concepts like intuition, experience and insight):   
 
"In applying the algorithm it is, in general, impossible to select an ever 
finer sequence of grids and a convergent sequence of subsimplices. An 
algorithm for a digital computer must be basically finite and cannot  
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involve an infinite sequence of successive refinements. ....... The passage 
to the limit is the nonconstructive aspect of Brouwer’s theorem, and we have 
no assurance that the subsimplex determined by a fine grid of vectors 
on S contains or is even close to a true fixed point of the mapping."   
[59], p.52; italics added     
 
Scarf, however, misses an important point here: it is not ‘the passage to the 
limit’ that ‘is the nonconstructive aspect of Brouwer’s theorem’ implying 
non-assurance of useful approximations; it is, instead the intrinsic 
undecidable disjunctions that characterize the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem. 
In one of only two of the standard textbooks on mathematical general 
equilibrium theory where the Uzawa equivalence theorem is explicitly 
discussed ([16], [78]), Starr’s clear and detailed presentation of the proof of 
Brouwer’s fix point theorem is based on the excellent and almost elementary 
exposition in [85] (particularly, pp.424-7). There, in turn, the appeal to the 
Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is made almost as with a magician’s wand31: 
 
"Making [the] assumption [that given any simplex S, there are 
subdivisions that are arbitrarily fine] we can now finish the proof of 
Browuer’s fixed-point theorem. We take an infinite sequence of 
subdivisions of S with mesh, that is, length of the longest 
one-dimensional edge, approaching 0. From each subdivision, we 
choose one simplex that carries all labels, and in this simplex we choose a 
single point. We thus have an infinite sequence of points in the original 
simplex S, and we can choose a subsequence that converges to a single point. 
This point .. is the limit point of the sequence of all vertices of all the 
simplexes from which the points of the convergent subsequence were 
                                                 
31 In the clear and elementary proof of the Brouwer fix point theorem given in Starr’s 
textbook (op.cit), the appeal to the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem is made when proving the 
KKM theorem (p. 62). In Scarf’s own elegant text (op.cit) invoking of this theorem occurs, 
during the proof of Brouwer’s theorem, on p. 51: 
"As the vectors are increasingly refined, a convergent subsequence of subsimplices 
may be found, which tend in the limit to a single vector x*.” (italics added)     
  Scarf is careful to claim that the required subsequence ‘may be found’, but does not claim 





originally chosen." ([85], p.427; all italics, except the first one, are added)     
 
The deceptive use of the word ‘choose’ in the above description of 
mathematical processes conveys the impression that the ‘choices’, in each case, 
are algorithmically implementable. However, it is only the first use of the word 
‘choose’ and the implied choice - i.e., choosing simplexes from increasingly fine 
subdivisions - that can be algorithmized constructively. The part that invokes 
the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, i.e., ‘Choosing a subsequence that converges to 
a single point’ - incidentally, this point is the sought after fixed-point of the 
Brouwer theorem – entails undecidable disjunctions and as long as any proof 
relies on this aspect of the theorem, it will remain unconstructifiable32. 
 
Why, then do two of the most renowned practitioners of applied general 
theory, especially in its policy aspects, John Shoven and John Whalley ([62]), 
make the following explicit claim:   
 
"The major result of postwar mathematical general equilibrium theory 
has been to demonstrate the existence of such an equilibrium by 
showing the applicability of mathematical fixed point theorems to 
economic models. ... Since applying general equilibrium models to 
policy issues involves computing equilibria, these fixed point theorems 
are important: It is essential to know that an equilibrium exists for a 
given model before attempting to compute that equilibrium. .....   
...  
The weakness of such applications is twofold. First, they provide 
                                                 
32 Over fifty years ago, when Brouwer returned to the topic of his famous theorem with an 
Intuitionist version of it, he made the trenchant observation that seems to have escaped the 
attention of mathematical economists: 
"[T]he validity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem [in intuitionism] would make the classical 
and the intuitionist form of fixed-point theorems equivalent." ([13], p.1).     
The invalidity of the Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem in any form of constructivism is due to its 





non-constructive rather than constructive proofs of the existence of 
equilibrium; that is, they show that equilibria exist but do not provide 
techniques by which equilibria can actually be determined. Second, 
existence per se has no policy significance. .... Thus, fixed point 
theorems are only relevant in testing the logical consistency of models 
prior to the models’ use in comparative static policy analysis; such 
theorems do not provide insights as to how economic behavior will 
actually change when policies change. They can only be employed in this 
way if they can be made constructive (i.e., be used to find actual equilibria). 
The extension of the Brouwer and Kakutani fixed point theorems in this 
direction is what underlies the work of Scarf.... on fixed point algorithms ...."   
ibid, pp12, 20-1; italics added     
 
Those who claim that they work with ‘computable’ general equilibrium 
models – the self-proclaimed followers of Leif Johansen, mentioned in the 
opening section, for example, and a host of applied general equilibrium, 
policy-motivated, theorists and applied economists – continue to anchor their 
work on an appeal to formal Arrow-Debreu equilibrium theory or its CGE 
variant. For example such a claim is most explicitly made in Part II of Kermal, 
et.al (1982). The exact claim is that the equilibria they – and others – compute, 
using  their versions of general equilibrium models, can be linked to, and 
theoretically substantiated by, the Arrow-Debreu equilibrium of pure theory. 
Thus, [21] p.153 (italics added):   
 
“[I]t is reasonable to ask if, in fact, a solution exists [for the CGE model] 
and, if so, whether or not it is unique. Most applied model builders, in 
contrast to theorists, have not worried too much about general 
existence problems. After all, a solution is numerically computed and an 
existence proof may appear unnecessary. The models are always quite 
well behaved and, given that very general existence proofs have been 
established for theoretical models of which CGE models form a rather 
well-behaved subset, it is reasonable to expect that nonexistence 
problems will not arise in practice. “   
 




The Arrow-Debreu equilibrium is provably uncomputable, both from the point of 
view of the mathematics of constructivism and recursion theory. The 
equilibria computed by any and every computable general equilibrium model 
used for development policy exercises – or those that are linked to, and 
derived from, variations of the Johansen model – have nothing whatsoever to 
do with the theoretical equilibria of general equilibrium theory.   
 
The technical results of these untenabilities, infeasibilities and infelicities are 
rigorously demonstrated in [90] and [91].   
 
Computable General Equilibrium theory has no grounding in computability or 
constructivity. Claims by applied general equilibrium theories of any variety 
that their work is anchored in any form of CGE is vacuous from a theoretical 
computational point of view. At best exercises by applied general equilibrium 
theorists can be considered ad hoc numerical exercises, seeking consistency 
and balance in accounts. Nothing more – especially nothing in theoretical 
anchors of any sort – is warranted. As long as a methodology that theorises in 
a kind of mathematics that is devoid of numerical meaning and 
computationally vacuous and relies on a schizophrenic appeal to a 
mathematics that is grounded in computational feasibilities, any claim of 
computability, constructivity or numerical feasibility must remain dubious, at 
best.   
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5. Computable Economics 
"[W]e want to stress that solutions that are not effectively computable are 
not properly solutions at all."   
[6], p.17; italics added.     
 
In computable economics, as in any computation with analogue computing 
machines or in classical behavioural economics, all solutions are based on 
effectively computable methods. Thus computation is intrinsic to the subject and 
all formally defined entities in computable economics – as in classical 
behavioural economics – are, therefore, algorithmically grounded.   
5.1  Briefly  ..... 
Given the algorithmic foundations of computability theory and the intrinsic 
dynamic form and content of algorithms, it is clear that this will be a 
‘mathematics with dynamic and algorithmic overtones’33. This means, thus, 
that computable economics is a case of a new kind of mathematics in old 
economic bottles. The ‘new kind of mathematics’ implies new questions, new 
frameworks, new proof techniques - all of them with algorithmic and 
dynamic content for digital domains and ranges.   
 
Some of the key formal concepts of computable economics are, therefore: 
solvability & Diophantine decision problems,  decidability & undecidability, 
computability & uncomputability,  satisfiability,  completeness & incompleteness, 
recursivity and recursive enumerability,  degrees of solvability (Turing degrees), 
universality & the Universal Turing Machine and Computational, algorithmic and 
                                                 
33“I think it is fair to say that for the main existence problems in the theory of economic 
equilibrium, one can now bypass the fixed point approach and attack the equations directly  
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stochastic  complexity. The proof techniques of computable economics, as a 
result of the new formalisms, will be, typically, invoking methods of: 
Diagonalization,  The Halting Problem for Turing Machines,  Rice’s Theorem, 
Incompressibility theorems, Specker’s Theorem, Recursion Theorems. For example, 
the recursion theorems will replace the use of traditional, non-constructive and 
uncomputable, topological fix point theorems, routinely used in orthodox 
mathematical analysis. The other theorems have no counterpart in 
non-algorithmic mathematics.   
 
In the spirit of pouring new mathematical wines into old economic bottles, the 
kind of economic problems of a digital economy that computable economics 
is immediately able to grant a new lease of life are the classic ones of: 
computable and constructive existence and learning of rational expectations 
equilibria, computable learning and complexity of learning, computable and 
bounded rationality, computability, constructivity and complexity of general 
equilibrium models, undecidability, self-reproduction and self-reconstruction 
of models of economic dynamics (growth & cycles), uncomputability and 
incompleteness in (finite and infinite) game theory and of Nash Equilibria, 
decidability (playability) of arithmetical games, the intractability 
(computational complexity) of optimization operators; etc.   
5.2  Formally  .... 
Suppose the starting point of the computable economist whose visions of 
                                                                                                                                            
to give existence of solutions, with a simpler kind of mathematics and even mathematics with 
dynamic and algorithmic overtones.”[75], p.290; italics added.      
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actual economic data, and its generation, are the following:   
 
Conjecture 14  Observable variables are sequences that are generated from 
recursively enumerable but not recursive sets, if rational agents underpin their 
generation.  
 
An aside: In 1974 Georg Kreisel posed the following problem:      
 
“We consider theories, ... and ask if every sequence of natural numbers 
or every real number which is well defined (observable) according to the 
theory must be recursive or, more generally, recursive in the data. ....... 
Equivalently, we may ask whether any such sequence of numbers, etc., 
can also be generated by an ideal computing or Turing Machine if the 
data are used as input. The question is certainly not empty because 
most objects considered in a ... theory are not computers in the sense 
defined by Turing. ........”   
[37], p.11     
 
The above conjecture has been formulated after years of pondering on 
Kreisel’s typically thought-provoking question. More recently, a reading of 
Osborne’s stimulating book ([49]), was also a source of inspiration in the 
formulation of the conjecture as an empirical disciplining criterion for 
computable economics.   
 
The conjecture is also is akin to the orthodox economic theorist and her 
handmaiden, the econometrician, assuming that all observable data emanate 
from a structured probability space and the problem of inference is simply to 
determine, by statistical or other means the parameters that characterise their 
probability distributions. If, therefore, the computable economist’s starting  
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point is the above conjecture then it follows that:   
 
Theorem 15  Only dynamical systems capable of computation universality can 
generate sequences that are members of sets that are recursively enumerable but not 
recursive.  
 
Theorem 16 Only dynamical systems capable of universal computation can extract 
patterns inherent in arbitrary, digitally generated, data, without assuming their 
generation by an underlying probability model. 
 
Corollary 17  Asymptotically stable dynamical systems are not capable of 
computation universality.   
 
Proposition 18 Only dynamical systems capable of computation universality are 
consistent with the no arbitrage hypothesis.   
 
Theorem 19 Rational economic agents in the sense of economic theory are equivalent 
to suitably indexed Turing Machines; i.e, decision processes implemented by rational 
economic agents - viz., choice behaviour - is equivalent to the computing behaviour of 
a suitable indexed Turing Machine.  
 
Put another way, this theorem states that the process of rational choice by an 
economic agent is equivalent to the computing activity of a suitably 
programmed Turing Machine. This is exactly parallel to the formalisation 




Conjecture 20 Dynamical systems capable of computation universality can persist 
in disequilibrium configurations for long time periods.  
 
Theorem 21 (Rabin, 1957) There are games in which the player who in theory can 
always win cannot do so in practice because it is impossible to supply him with 
effective instructions regarding how he should play in order to win.   
 
The next item has been mentioned twice already in this essay; but I restate it 
here just for completion.   
 
Theorem 22 Undecidability of Hilbert’s tenth problem  
There is no algorithm which, for a given arbitrary Diophantine equation, would tell 
whether the equation has a solution or not.  
 
Theorem 23 Halting Problem for Turing Machines  
Suppose we are given a Turing Machine computable function ) (m fn . Then there is no 
general algorithm for determining, for arbitrary  0 ≥ n and  0 ≥ m , whether ) (m fn   is 
defined.  
 
Theorem 24 Rice’s Theorem: Let C be a class of partial recursive functions. Then 





Claim 25 Validity of the Church-Turing Thesis on Effective Calculability   
 
Theorem 26 Specker’s Theorem in Computable Analysis ([77], pp. 145-58)   
 
A sequence exists with an upper bound but without a least upper bound.   
 
Theorem 27 The Pour-El/Richards Theorem   
 
There exists an Ordinary Differential Equation (ODE) s.t:  )] ( , [ ) ( t t F t ϕ ϕ = ′  with 
0 ) 0 ( = ϕ , s.t: F(x,y) is computable on the rectangle [0 ≤ x ≤ 1, -1 ≤ y ≤ 1] , but no 




Theorem 28 Fix Point Theorem  
Suppose that  n m F F → Φ :   is a recursive operator (or a recursive program P). Then 
there is a partial function  φ f   that is the least fixed point of  Φ 
 
Theorem 29  ; ) ( φ φ f f = Φ  
If  g g = Φ ) ( , then  g f ⊆ φ  
 
Remark 30 If, in addition to being partial,  φ f   is also total, then it is the unique 
least fixed point.  
 
Finally, related to invariance theorems in the domain of algorithmic  
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complexity theory and the fix point theorem of classical recursion theory, we 
have the recursion theorem, essential for understanding self-reproduction and 
self-reconstruction (for computable growth theory):   
 
Theorem 31  Recursion Theorem Let T be a Turing Machine that computes a 
function:  
 
* * * : Σ → Σ × Σ t  (5) 
Then, there is a Turing Machine R that computes a function: 
 
* * : Σ → Σ r          ( 6 )  
such that,  : ω ∀  
  ) , ( ) ( ω ω > < = R t r    (7) 
where, <R>: denotes the encoding of the Turing Machine into its standard 
representation as a bit string; and the *(star) operator denotes its standard role 
as a unary operator defined as:  : } , 0 | ,... , { * 2 1 A x k x x x A i K ∈ ∀ ≥ =  
 
The idea behind the recursion theorem is to formalize the activity of a Turing 
Machine that can obtain its own description and, then, compute with it. All 
malicious ‘hackers’, perhaps with no knowledge of this theorem, are invoking 
this theorem every time they generate viruses! More seriously, this theorem is 
essential, too, for formalizing, recursion theoretically, a model of growth in a 
digital economy and to determine and learn, computably and constructively, 
rational expectations equilibria. The fix point theorem and the recursion theorem are 
also indispensable in the computable formalization of policy ineffectiveness 
postulates, time inconsistency and credibility in the theory of macroeconomic  
46 
 
p o l i c y .  E v e n  m o r e  t h a n  i n  m i c r o e c o nomics, where topological fix point 
theorems have been indispensable in the formalizations underpinning 
existence proofs, the role of the above fix point theorem and the related 
recursion theorem are absolutely fundamental in what I come to call Computable 
Macroeconomics.  
 
Anyone who is able to formalize these theorems, corollaries and conjectures 
and work with them – and accept the claim – as those that are to discipline 
economic theoretical criteria, would have mastered all the necessary 
mathematics of computable economics. Unlike so-called computable general 
equilibrium theory and its offshoots, computable economics – and its 
offshoots – are intrinsically computational and numerical.   
6. Agent Based Computational Economics 
"It is suggested that a system of chemical substances, called 
morphogens, reacting together and diffusing through a tissue, is 
adequate to account for the main phenomena of morphogenesis. ...   
Most of an organism, most of the time, is developing from one pattern 
into another, rather than from homogeneity into a pattern. One would 
like to be able to follow this more general process mathematically also. 
The difficulties are, however, such that one cannot hope to have any 
very embracing theory of such processes beyond the statement of the 
equations. It might be possible, however, to treat a few particular cases 
in detail with the aid of a digital computer. ..... The essential 
disadvantage of the method is that one only gets results for particular 
cases. ...  The morphogen theory of phyllotaxis, to be described, ..., in 
a later paper, will be covered by this computational method. 
Non-linear equations will be used."   
[86], pp. 37, 71-2; italics in the original.     
 
The origins of what has become agent based computational methods can be 
traced to the pioneering works of Turing on Morphogenesis [86], von Neumann  
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on  The Theory of Self-Reproducing Automata ([94]), and Ulam on Nonlinear 
dynamics ([28], [79]). A ‘second generation’ of pioneers were Conway ([7]) and 
Wolfram [96]), the former directly in the von Neumann tradition and the 
latter straddling the von Neumann and Ulam traditions – i.e., working on the 
interface between cellular automata modelling and dynamical system 
interpretation of the transition equations.   
 
Remarkably, there was an independent tradition in economics, pioneered by 
Richard Goodwin ([29]), in his computational studies of coupled markets, 
which directly inspired Herbert Simon’s approach to the computational study 
of evolutionary dynamics in terms of semi-decomposable linear systems 
([64]).  
 
Sadly, none of these classics have had the slightest impact on the current 
frontiers of agent based computational economics (see, for example, [83]). 
Had any awareness of the classics, their frameworks, the questions they posed, 
the tentative answers they obtained, the research directions they suggested 
had been absorbed, even in some rudimentary way, many of the exaggerated 
claims and assertions of the advocates of agent based computable economics 
would have been less absurd, more measured and, surely, also humbler in the 
e x p e c t a t i o n s  o f  w h a t  t h i s  l i n e  o f  computational research could and must 
achieve. An example of the utterly untenable claim of a senior advocate of 
agent based computational economics may convey our sadness of the lack of 
anchoring in the classics more vividly. In his chapter, titled Agent-Based Macro  
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([83], p. 1626; italics added), Axel Leijonhufvud asserts that34:  
 
"Agent-based computational methods provide the only way in which 
the self-regulatory capabilities of complex dynamic models can be 
explored so as to advance our understanding of the adaptive dynamics 
of actual economies."     
 
Quite apart from the many undefined – even formally undefinable 
unambiguously – concepts in this remarkably unscholarly statement, the 
extraordinary claim that ‘agent-based computational methods provide the 
only way’ to understand anything, let alone of the ’adaptive dynamics of 
actual economies’, must make the scientific spirit of Goodwin and Simon 
writhe in intellectual pain – not to mention the noble ghosts of Ulam, von 
Neumann and Turing.   
 
What are ‘agent-based computational methods’? Do they transcend Turing 
Machine computation? If so, how – and why? How does one link a 
computationally implemented method with a complex dynamical system, 
even assuming that it is possible to define such a thing unambiguously and 
consistent with the dynamics of a computation?   
 
On the other hand, agent based computable economic practice is closely tied 
to the belief that such models are capable of generating so-called ‘emergent 
phenomena’, in the sense that their existence cannot be predicted from the 
                                                 
34  When one of us first read this extraordinary statement, his mind went back to the witticism 
with which Dennis Robertson reacted when he supposedly first heard of revealed preference., 
[56], p.19: 
 "Dare I confess that when I first heard this term ... I thought that perhaps to some 
latter-day saint, in some new Patmos off the coast of Massachusetts, the final solution 
of all these mysteries had been revealed in a new apocalypse?"  
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underpinning laws of individual agent interactions. Very little scholarship on 
the rich tradition of philosophical, epistemological, computational and 
dynamic research – with a solid contribution to the epistemology of 
simulation (cf. [95]) – on ‘emergence’ is manifested in the frontier research by 
agent based computational economists ( a paradigmatic example of inflated 
claims and deficient scholarship on agent based computational modelling, the 
tortuous concept of ‘reductionism’ and the possibility of so-called ‘emergent 
aggregative phenomena’ can be found in [19]).   
 
No better characterisation of the practice of agent based computational 
economists can be given that the one Arthur Burks gave (cf. [14], p. xviii), on a 
related ‘procedure for investigating cellular spaces’:   
 
"The investigator starts with a certain global behavior and wants to 
find a transition function for a cellular automaton which exhibits that 
behaviour. He then chooses as subgoals certain elementary behavioral 
functions and proceeds to define his transition function piece-meal so 
as to obtain these behaviors.   
.....  
The task of searching for a transition function which produces a 
specified behavior is an arduous task because there are so many 
possible partial transition functions to explore."     
 
The formal difficulties of ‘searching for a transition function’ are provably 
intractable, at best; algorithmically undecidable, in general. Even when found, 
depending on the way the data generating process if characterised, whether 
the transition function – when viewed as a finite automaton – ‘halts’ at the 
prescribed state is, again, in general, algorithmically undecidable, 
Correspondingly, when viewed as a dynamical system, whether the global  
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behaviour is an attractor or is in a particular basin of attraction of the 
dynamical system, is algorithmically undecidable. Whether a set of initial 
conditions, for the transition function, can be algorithmically determined such 
that their halting state is the desired global behaviour, or such that the global 
behaviour is in the basin of attraction of the transition function as a dynamical 
system, is decidable only for trivial sets.   
 
And so on!   
 
Suppose we succeed in finding such a transition function – as many agent 
based computational economists claim they can, and have – and want to 
characterise it either in terms of computability theory or as a dynamical 
system. Suppose, also, that we ask the questions the pioneers asked: the 
feasibility of self-reproduction, self-reconstruction, evolution, computation 
universality, decidability of limit sets of the transition function when 
interpreted as a dynamical system, whether the transition function, viewed as 
an finite automaton, is subject to the Halting Problem, and so on. At the least, 
any reasonable notion of ‘emergence’ requires unambiguous answers to most 
of these questions – all of which are, in general, subject to algorithmic 
undecidabilities.  
 
Agent based computational economics is vacuous from an epistemological 
point of view, when viewed either from the point of view of computation 
theory or from a dynamical systems point of view, contrary to many and 
varied claims to the contrary. We locate the vacuity on the lack of anchoring  
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in the noble traditions broached by the pioneers. That the Fermi-Pasta-Ulam 
problem remains impervious to analysis, computational experiments or 
dynamical system explorations should be a lesson for those economists who 
think they have found a panacea to all modelling ills. Above all, it is strange 
that the overwhelming majority – if not, in fact, all – of agent based 
computational economists are not aware of the disciplining criteria with 
which the pioneers embarked on computational explorations in cellular space. 
This is why agent based computational economics is essentially an 
exploration of cellular spaces with finite automata that do not have the power 
of Turing Machines – i.e., the transition functions that are routinely used for 
cellular space exploration by agent based computable economists are not 
partial recursive functions, if, indeed, many, or any, of them are even aware of 
such finessed distinctions between classes of functions; there is certainly no 
evidence of any such awareness in any of the contributions in [4], [81] or in 
[19].  
7. Towards an Epistemology of Computation in 
Economics 
"Do we overpass ... the Turing-Church ‘barrier’ and compute the 
uncomputable? Not exactly. We just move the discussion in another 
territory that of processes that handle information. This syntagma is so 
general that in these terms ‘everything is a computation’; it is a matter 
of point of view (‘for every process there is an observer which can 
interpret the process as a computation’)"   
[50], p. 345     
 
’Does nature compute?’, is a question natural scientists ask with increasing 
frequency. The differential equations, or maps, that seem to characterise the  
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dynamical systems of nature are hardly ever analytically ‘solvable’. Either we 
m u s t  t r y  t o  d e v i s e  a n d  e v o l v e  a n  epistemology to come to terms with 
‘unsolvability’ and, therefore, accept a ‘truth deficit’ – that ‘true’ solutions are 
inherently unreachable – or find other ways to represent nature’s processes. 
One such alternative way is to interpret nature’s processes as computations. 
But computations, too, may not ‘halt’. A master dynamical system theorist 
outlined the dilemma cogently:   
 
"We regard the computer as an ’oracle’ which we ask questions. 
Questions are formulated as input data for sets of calculations. There 
are two possible outcomes to the computer’s work: either the 
calculations rigorously confirm that a phase portrait is correct, or they 
fail to confirm it. .... The theory that we present states that if one begins 
with a structurally stable vector field, there is input data that will yield a 
proof that a numerically computed phase portrait is correct. However, this 
fails to be completely conclusive from an algorithmic point of view, because 
one has no way of verifying that a vector field is structurally stable in advance 
of a positive outcome. Thus, if one runs a set of trials of increasing 
precision, the computer will eventually produce a proof of correctness 
of a phase portrait for a structurally stable vector field. Presented with 
a vector field that is not structurally stable, the computer will not 
confirm this fact; it will only fail in its attempted proof of structural 
stability35. Pragmatically, we terminate the calculation when the computer 
produces a definitive answer or our patience is exhausted. .... 
  The situation described in the previous paragraph is analogous to the 
question of producing a numerical proof that a continuous function has 
a zero. ..... Numerical proofs that a function vanishes can be expected 
to succeed only when the function has qualitative properties that can 
be verified with finite-precision calculations."   
[31], pp.154-5, italics added.     
 
We have discussed and described alternative visions of computation in 
economics. What, then, if the economy is itself a computer? Do economic 
processes, whether aggregative or not, embody the results of a computation? 
                                                 
35A reader, equipped with the standard knowledge of classical recursion theory, would 
immediately invoke the distinction between recursive and recursively enumerable sets to make  
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Do we, as economists, observing the economy’s computational processes, 
impute computability properties to the economy? Analogous to 
Guckenheimer’s thought experiment, if the data set generated by the 
economy as a computer is recursively enumerable but not recursive, 
inferences abut the computability properties of the economy will remain 
incomplete. On the other hand, if we – as observers – feed the economy with 
data sets that are also recursively enumerable but not recursive, then whether 
the economy, as a computer, will be able to process it in a definitive way will 
remain unknown for an indeterminate period.   
 
Whether definitive knowledge of the structure of the economy can be 
obtained by observing its processes will depend on the metaphors we use to 
characterise it; for example, characterising the economy as a finite automaton 
or a dynamical system whose limit sets are stable limit points makes it easy to 
infer structural properties by observations of the outcome of its processes. 
This is the standard approach to modelling and inference of economic 
dynamics.  
 
In the computable approach to economics, the starting point is that the 
economy is a Turing Machine and the data it generates forms a set that is 
recursively enumerable but not recursive. If so, what can be inferred about the 
structure of the economy may only b e  e x p l o r e d  b y  T u r i n g  M a c h i n e  
computation, without any guarantee that a definitive answer will be obtained.   
                                                                                                                                            
precise sense of this important observation.  
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Computation in economics becomes epistemologically meaningful only when 
the economic modeller, using computational metaphors to analyse the data 
generated by the economy, begins to accept, at least pro tempore, that the 
economy is itself a computer. This is the natural mode of interaction between 
the economy and the classical behavioural economist and the computable 
economist; it is not the natural mode for the CGE theorist, nor for the agent 
based computational economist. This is why there is a serious epistemological 
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